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FOR RELEASE WEDNESDAY A.M. 's
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
at the
CAROLINA FORUM, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1971 - 8:00 p.m., e.d.s . t.

NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN RELATIONS
It may well be recorded in the future that the
whole international order shi~ted and reorganized itself
in a short span of time in the early 1970 ' s .

The accelerat-

ing transition is evident for those of us who are living
through today 's changes.
the shift

portend~ .

What cannot be foreseen is what

Does it lead to a new era of confronta-

tion or toward a new plateau of international stability?
How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we
in the United States bring to our understanding of our
times .
At the outset, I would point to several manifestations of the current transition in the world and the responses
to them in the nation's foreign policy.

The most immediate, of

course, is the President's new economic program.
years of over-extension has stretched the
breaking point.

u. s.

Twenty- five
economy to the

In what amounted to a financial crisis, the

President combined a de facto devaluation of the dollar and a

..
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blanket increase in import duties with a domestic treeze ot
wages and prices.
That something had to give tn the way the

u. s.

government was managing the nation's financial attaira was
eVident tor a long time.

When the movea came. however. it ia

underatandable that they cauaed great distress abroad .

What

is teared elaewhere. notably 1n Europe and Japan. is not so
much the moves themaelvea but what they could portend.

At

stake are the export markets 1n the United State• and, hence,
the shrinking ot a great deal ot international purchasing power.
It is understandable, 1n the circumstances that the
search tor new economic alignments ha8 intensified .

The United

Kingdom is moving• tor example, toward the European Economic
Commtmity • now• with the support ot France.

Germany, in tact

the whole ot Western Europe, is tending toward closer commercial
relationships with Eastern Europe.

Por ita part, the SOviet

union seem• eager to facilitate this process through political
stabilization.

~us,

the legitimacy ot West Berlin as an
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appendaae or West Oerm.&n7 haa been acknowledged and the
Soviet government is preaatng tor agreement to legalize
the territorial changea 1n Eaatern Europe after World War II,
including the diviaion or Oer.any.

The awardtng ot the Wobel

Peace Prize to the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which. 1n
m,. judpent. ia well deaerved, tracea 1n major part to the

1Dt.petua that he haa given to these developm.enta.

The t1ni ted

State• ia acquieactng, 1n the new trends 1n Europe, at a pace,
however, which aeema sometimes as reluctant aa it ia belated,
and one would hope that the Preaident•a planned viait to
Noacow repreaents an acceleration ot the adjuataent.
tl.

s. policies are

to the Far East.
1n

1n transition, too. with regard

It aeellla to me, we may have learned, at last

Viet lfaa, the tolly ot extending ideological teara and

great power animoa1t1es into the inner cont11cta ot underdeveloped reg1ona.

The Vietnaaeae war haa been drained ot
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meaning for this nation.

It is revealed, now, as a tragic

waste, a revelation that ia reflected 1n the President • s
J:I"'gl'&m

ot phaae4 troop withdrawals.

over for this nation.

In

that sense. the war is

There is left 1n Southeast Asia, however,

the vestige ot the mistakes ot the past which continue to exact
a toll ot aenaelesa death and devastation.

one

way or another--

by the action ot the President or the Congress or by both-that vestige must and will be removed.
Perhaps, an end to the Indochinese involvement will
be facilitated by the re-awakening ot the Stno-u.
In any

s.

relationship.

event, China seems to be moving out of a phase of

isolation into one of more active participation 1n world affairs.
The ettect ot this transition and the u.

s.

response to it may

well be causing internal distress in Chtna, the Soviet union,
1n Japan and Taiwan and, undoubtedly, new thoughts 1n all of them.

There is a point of central significance in these and
similar phenomena.

The lingering legacies of World War II

are being liquidated 1n a massive readjust ent.

It ia a

cataclysmic process, analogou. to tbe geological adjustments

6
c&8e with policies based on dead tictions a oppoaed to
living circuaatances.
The changea tn the legal perspective of our policies
are over-shadowed tor the mc:ment by the adjustment• which seek
to accommodate to contemporary economic rea11tiea.

In general,

theae adjuatmenta reflect the tact *bat the United Statea,
having eerved 1n a variety of role a, aa the world • s chief
banker, policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well aa the
chief pioneer 1n outer space. has now approached the limits ot
ita economic capacity and that some of the burdens and the
"tirsta" have to be rec:Uatributed.

At last reporta, I underatand,

we had even abandoned the efforts of the cultural warriors to
"catch up" and aurpaaa the Russians in the claaaical ballet.
Current adjustments in our international position
have concentrated more heavily on the commercial-ttnancial
elementa than an certain other over-extended roles abroad,
which I ahall discuss shortly.

However, I would like to take

a moment to consider at this point what has occurred under the

7
Presi~ent's

new economic program.

The economic power of the

united States has been preeminent 1n the world tor the past
quarter century.

U.

s.

markets have absorbed vast quantities

of goods trom other nations and sent abroad even greater
quantities.

This nation has led world policy, notably in the

so-called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, into an era of
vastly expanded international trade through the reciprocal
r

oval of trade barriers .
At the same

t~e,

the U.

s.

has been the central

banker of the international payments system.

Settling of

accounts between nations has been based for a quarter of a
century on the dollar and on its convertibility into gold .

The

system worked well as long as other nations were prepared to
hold dollars in their reserves or had free access to

u. s.

gold.

Neither of these conditions remains operative at this time.
So a search for new devices to facilitate financial exchange
is underway.

In recent international conferences, there have

been proposals for the realignments of values among the various

9
Far cor 1 portant, ue should not lose sight of t he
tact that the era ot expanding international trade which we
have fostered tor two decades cay go down as one of t he truly
positive advances in international relations in the 20th
century.

It has sttmulated a highly useful ccono ic exchange

that has strengthened the fabric ot world stability.

It has

served to underwrite, too, a long period or mutual economic
well-being and cultural enrichment .
ecessa~J

thoUZh they may be, the new economic

policies are, at beot, temporary expedients.

Without indulging,

I hope, in excessive hindsight, I am bound to say that the
adjust ents might have been easier for us and all the world,
had

c faced up to our predicament at an earlier date and

proceeded in a more measured way to negotiate the necessary
relict.
So tar, the other principal tradin nations have
eschewed acts of reprisal.

That unfortunate possibility, however,

does exist and on the basis of very recent reports has now been

10

expressed for the first time by a reciproe 1 t rift increase
by

D~rk .

That is a small begtrtning.

Should there be a

trade war, it \tould unravel the strands of a beneficial
interdependence which have been uoven so carefully over the past
two dec des .
In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President's
stress on the temporary nature ot the surtax and his emphatic
opposition to a return to economic isolationism.

The possibility

of an inadvertant slide tn that direction, however, is not to
be overlooked.

To avoid it, it seecs to me that fe must take

more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are
contained in the New Economic Policy.
This brings us to the non- commercial aspects of the
nation's international economic difficulties .

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying too
much and selling too little of goods and services in international
co

erce; the fact is that, for years,

deal more than we have bought.

e have sold a great

Rather, the difficulty arises,
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1n

jor

part~

from the spending of vast amounts ot public

fUnds 1n order to maintain an outmoded mllitary- diplomatle
position in the world.

Dollars spent abroad to uncJerwrite that

position flow overseas just aa surely aa those which go tor
imports ot good a from other nations.

Dollars spent at home

to backstop that position contribute just as

certa~ly

to the

inflationary pressures as any other non- productive expenditure
in the federal budget.

In my

judgment~

we are paying exorbitantly- -in

billions ot dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices
which are simply out of date ani! which no longer have much to
do with the security and welfare ot the people ot the nation.
Like other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices
are in urgent need of revision.
There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of
the war 1n Viet Bam.

&lding the war 18 the

bua1ne8s ot this nation.

oat compelling

It is obviously not only a matter ot

cost; before all else, Viet Dam 18 a vast human tragedy which

12

tears at the fibers ot the nation's cohesion.

Nevertheless.

Viet Ham is also a root cause ot the nation's present economic
dlttlcultiea.

What is involved is an astronomical levy of

government expenditure on the nation's economy 1n order to
finance the

war~

$130 billion.

to date, something ln the neighborhood of

This expenditure has burdened the productive

economy at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and

inflation~

hence, reducing the competitive position ot the nation's
commerce 1n the world.

A great deal ot it, moreover, has been

spent abroad, contributing directly to the negative balance of
payments .
In two and a halt years, it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the cost
of the involvement in Viet Nam.
has been, it is all to the good .

Prolonged as the reduction
It is to be hoped, however,

that what 1a being attempted is not

a~ply

a gradual tapering

ott ot the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue.

In Viet am,

that would still involve, tor many years, in my judgment,
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cont1nu1ng expenditures of billions in 14 to the Saigon
govern::1ent as well as the maintenance of

u. s.

forces 1n

coastal enclaves 1n order to shore up a regime with few roots
in its own people.

war by other means .

lt would be a continuation of a mistaken
It 111ould be a way ot being involved without

seeming to be tnvolved.

Even it it were possible to attain,

it would be a solution that is ill-suited to the needs of
either Viet llam or the United States.
The Senate has tried to establish a date certain for
a total w1thdraual of U.

s.

forces as the policy of this nation.

Since definitessurances do not yet exist on this point--and
I might say that the outright opposition of the Executive
Branch on this matter only leads to apprehensions as to what
the long range intentions really are-- it can be expected that
the

tter will be pressed in the Congress; it will be pressed

gain and again until the involvement on the Southeast Asian

inland ends, loc ~, stock and barrel.

As elusive as it has

14
se ecS, the

d~q

must and will co e when the laat

u. s.

aol4ier boarda the last troop carrier, the last helicopter
11tta ott Vletnameae ao11, and the laat

u. s.

troop ship

leavea the Vietnameae coast.
When we leave Indochina, we will have cloaed the
book on m111taey involvement on the Aaian mainland.

It would

not be 1n thia nation'• interest, however, to cloee our eyes
to what tranap1rea on the other aide of the Pacific.

It 11

t1me to aak ouraelvea now what we will remain, not Juat 1n
Viet Naa but 1n all ot Eaat Aaia, not 1n terma ot the devaatatlon and d1arupt1on which la aelt-evident but in term. ot new
policiea which will safeguard tbia nat1on'a interest and contrlbut more effectively to peace 1n the years ahead.
It haa aeemecJ to me that the Nixon Doctrine alght
contain guiding pr1nciplea in th1a reapect.

In m¥ Judgment,

that will not be the caae unleaa the Doctrine aeana the
complete teraination ot

u. s.

ailltary involvement everywhere
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pol1cie an well as to the contraction of our military
projection in Southeast Asia.
In any event, the e ergence of China fran a

period of isolation does seem to me to open new approaches
to Pacific security
would

hope~

tor

by

the avenue ot nezotiations .

example~

1n

the not too distant

one

future~

for quadripartite discussions between China, Japan, the
Soviet union and the United States .
do

~h

Such discussions could

to allay unwarranted tears and establish a baais for

adjusting nattanal interests .

They could provide insights

into vital ouestions involving the internal situation in
China, including the status or

~aiwan,

intentions or the Soviet Union 1n the
the

econo~c

into the anxieties and
~estern Pac!t'ic~

needs not only or Japan and the

u. s.

into

but of all

four nations, and into the prospects for curbing nuclear
dev lopments in Asia.

Of immediate importance, quadripartite

18
discussions might provide a vehicle tor stabilising and restoring

An7 regional

the Indochina peninsula 1n the poat-war era.

aecurity arrang•enta which llllght ensue therefrom could be dovetailed with a progressive reduction in the

u. s.

military presence

around the rtm ot Asia over the next tew years.
In Europe there is also a need to cut outmoded military

commitments by new aecurity arrana•ents, the door to which baa now
been opened by West 0el'11UU'ly and the Soviet llnion.

Inaotar as

this nation is concerned, it is long past the tiae to lighten
the archai.c burdens of NATO.

Two decades ago, the united States

joined the nations ot Western Europe in a common commitment to
the North Atlantic Treat7.

The Treaty remains pertinent today,

but the bureaucratic organization--NATO--which has grown u-p
under the Treaty corresponds not so much to contemporary circumstances in Europe but to those which existed in Europe before
I'.Jl8nY or J'OU were bom.

19
At that tillle• the tree societiea or Western Europe
were heavilY dependent on the United States and the tear ot
COJIJ8Wl1at totalitartan takeovers waa great .
in Korea.

A war was raging

It was a t11le ot trouble. or great international

uncertainty.
That ia not the acene toda7.

Agalnat what is now vlaible- -

a proaperoua, stable Western Europe and a growing contact with
Eastern Europe. IATO ls over-started, over-manned. over-ott1cered
and over-financed b7 this nation.

ot the budget ot the Departaent ot Defense • about $14
billion ia estimated to be traceable to KATO.

OVer a halt- a1111on

American servicemen and dependents are still conaianed to EUrope.
That is an immense diversion ot our resources .
question ot NATO ia not coat.

Yet. the basic

It a commitment ot that magnitude

were essential tor the aeeurit7 of the nation and the atabilit7
ot th1a nation's peace. ot course, it should be made.

the point, however. ls whether a huge

More to

u. s. deplo,aent in

Europe

continues to have relevance a quarter or a centu17 atter World Warii .
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In this connection, I retumed Just a month ago 1'rom a series of

consultations 1n

number of nations in Western Europe.

The over-

whelming mood there is that or detente and peace; it is not

frontation and war.

ot con-

The emphasis is on reconciliation; 1t is on

intra-European commerce, technological exchange, travel and other
cultural interchange.

It 1a not on military power or tear or mili·

tary conflict.

only in NA'l'O circles are tho games of war still

played with

sense of expectancy or conviction 1n Western Europe.

~

Let me reiterate my belief that we do need the Korth
Atlantic Treaty and Alliance.

We do need to preserve the structure

ot UATO as an element-1n-be1ng or westem defense and unit7.

But I

also believe the organization can be trtmmed to a streamlined standby
torce and our proportionate role can be reduced.

I am persuaded that

that can be done without additional danger to our security or the
stability ot peace 1n EUrope and with great benefit to the nation'•
well-being.

I am persuaded, too, that unless it is done aoon, Western

unit7 may very well give W&7 under the weight of ita anachront....
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Thcr
1n

is a ba ic lesson 1n the excesses or policy

Euro e and A 1a of the ast dec d or more.

reco~

this:

cd and ap

It should be

lied to other areas of the orld.

It 1a

·ilitary and other national power calc1fiec2 aroun4

r1 id foreign policies tends to be not only aoteful but
dangerous to the nation • s future .

~7e

uot b come extremely

wary of all cocrmitments of

~1litary

assistance anc2 all forma

of foreian aid 1n areas o

instability abroad where our national

interests arc not w1olly clear or clearly at stake .
Thnt applies

~ith

special r levance today to our

involve ent 1n the chronic troubles of the
need to be said here that ther

~1deast .

It hardly

is a cr at deal of sympathetic

interest 1n this nation with reeard to the survival of Israel .
It io not inconsistent uith either that sympathy or the
interests of tbis

nation~

hot

entrap ent 1n the Middle East

ever., to avoid
t

au. s.

military

h1 ch ca.n take the form ot an

inadvertent military confrontation with the Soviet union or
another Viet Ira: •

22

What ia 1n our national intereat 1n the Mideast.
aa it la 1n the 1ntereata of all the nationa of that region
and the world ia the atab111ty of the preaent truce. the
reaolutlon or territorial conflicts. ana. remote aa the
poaa1bil1ty may now aeem, progreaa towards a new era or coexistence and economic interchange between Israel and the
Arab Statea.
In this connection. I support the eftorta or the

Secretary or State 1n cooperation with others to secure an
interim peace

agree~ent

which has aa its main objective the

reopening ot the Suez canal.

Aa I underatand them. the

Secretary' a proposals provide for preliminary agreement on a
cease tire and on the principle of troop withdrawal without
final or complete agreement at this time.

The rationale, I

ahould think, is that agreement on thia ulttmate objective,
may make it possible to locate way-atat1ona en route.
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If 111tary restraint and a new emphasis on
multilateral action applies 1n Asia and the 41ddle Eaat.
it applies, too. with regard to Latin America.

Policies

for the Southern hemisphere, it seems to me, must resist
te~ptationa

to extend additional military or other unilateral

aid and to reduce further what now flows through these channels.
Unilateral aid can come to represent an intrusion into volatile
political environments and leaA, 1n the end, to direct
involve ents.
It should be ncted that just last week, the Senate
passed legislation to fund the Inter-American Development Bank
at the annual rate of 900 million for the next two years.
This multi-national 1nat1tut1on, along with others of its
ktnd, should constitute the heart of the nation's foreign
economic aid policy.
of unilateral U.

s.

The sooner it brings about the termination
assistance the better for all concerned.

Let me close these remarks on the same note on
which they were opened.

Let me stress my belief that we have

24
co~

to

8

notable turning point nnd

opportunity.

8

notabl

We 1'111 have to cale many chen cs to adjust

policies effectively to the realities of the 19 O's .
changes have uch to do

~ith

The

an end to the illusions of

national omnipotence a.nd o miocience and the tra ic adventuria
to which they have led in Southeast Asia.
a readiness to share the lare of

~orld

The changes involve

leadership which has

focused upon this nation for too long.
We stanCi, no11, on the threshhold of a ncl1 era 1n
which prime motivations are appearing which are other than the
fear of aggression and war.

There may exist a possibility

ot breakine down antagonisms along the gulf separat1ng the
Commtm1st states from those of the Western ' orld.
The

pro~ise

1s there .

To realize it will tato a

vision of the world far less constrained than has been the
case tor the past t enty.. five years .
to view national

p~1er

We 1111 have to begin

not just as an 1notrurr.ent of territorial

defense or the defense of

1deolo~ical

systems. but rather as

25
nn ele ent of

hu~

BUTV1val

r ao rces can then be co
fund ental
nationality:

probl~

an~

well-bein • National

i tted 1n :far greater de ree to the

which tnow no boundaries of race or

Population control, the preservation

resources, pollution abate ent and the
h

Dn

or

cnli~tenrnent

spirit ttherever and however it 1a oppressed.

natur.al

of the

